Economic growth plays a much bigger role than trade in fuelling growing carbon emissions, and its own containment is much more likely to significantly reduce emissions than trade policy interventions. And since a lot of global merchandise trade is in emissions-intensive manufactures, the more critical issue could be the level of trade in accordance with non-traded services compared to the product and country composition of trade, which trade policy proposals largely address. Having said this, however, there will be the large differences in emissions intensities across countries and therefore there are potential roles for (non-MFN) country discrimination in trade policy.
Policies to market the transition towards a sustainable energy system have not fully materialised to the extent expected just a few years ago. Indeed, the time between 2010 and 2012 is linked to the paradoxical situation of a revival of coal imports and a reduced amount of gas consumption. Specifically, gross inland consumption for 2012 showed a decline in gas consumption of 14%, a decline in oil consumption of 11%, and a rise in coal consumption of 8% regarding 2010 levels (Eurostat 2013). Furthermore, in 2011 gas in the EU recorded its largest decline on record – a loss of 9.9% – which includes been related to a weak economy, a big gas price differential because of shale gas extraction in america, the sunshine, and continued growth in renewable power generation (BP Statistical Review 2012).
The expense of supporting the production of renewable energy seems eye-watering. This column argues, however, that the choice of another energy system lacking the advantages of low-cost zero-carbon technologies is a lot more costly. Some renewable technologies aren’t yet competitive on cost with mature carbon-intensive technologies, support for renewables could be justified by learning spillovers.
Jason Furman, Ron Shadbegian, Jim Stock , 25 February 2015
The COP21 conference faces a severe problem in terms of funding climate adaptation in developing countries. This column examines novel ways of raise the funding. The strategies derive from high individual carbon emitters wherever they are on the globe, rather than in line with the responsibilities of high-emitting countries. To the end, a worldwide distribution of individual income and CO2e emissions is constructed.
The 21st US Climate Change Conference has been held in Paris. One key issue to be debated pertains to the financing of climate adaptation in developing countries, i.e. how exactly to finance investments in infrastructure and human capital to create societies more resilient to the impacts of climate change. Climate adaptation happens to be under-funded: the needs range between €100bn to €300bn a year in line with the US (UNEP 2014), but significantly less than €10bn is currently focused on climate adaptation funds (OECD 2015).
The ECB’s top management and German policymakers have rejected these proposals because their implementation would blur the boundaries between your responsibilities of monetary and fiscal policy (Weidmann 2011). Because of this, Eurozone leaders decided in July 2011 to handle contagion by allowing the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to intervene in the secondary markets based on an ECB analysis recognising the existence of exceptional financial-market circumstances and risks to financial stability.
Buyers of new cars in holland have a solid preference for three colours: black, blue, and silver/grey. Together these colours take into account almost 80% of cars leaving the dealership during the last couple of years. As Figure 1 shows, car buyers have grown to be a lot more conservative within their taste. Red and green have already been out of fashion for two years now, particularly silver/grey is becoming very popular.
Tastes far away are also relevant as a non-negligible part of most stolen cars are designed for export – to eastern Europe specifically. Although there is some variation across countries which colours are most popular (with some variance in the popularity of white), there is fantastic similarity in taste with regards to unpopular colours. Data from DuPont, a significant manufacturer of car paint, show that preferences in holland are roughly consistent with those in other Europe (DuPont Automotive 2009). Going for a worldwide view, black, blue, white, and silver/grey constituted some 86% of new car sales in ’09 2009. The other 14% is left for colours such as for example green, yellow, red, and orange.
Possibly the best evidence for the mechanism where PDT improved child health is from its perverse effects – rising malnutrition in neighbouring municipalities. An extended literature has documented ‘displacement’ effects incompatible, where rebel groups might simply be pushed to neighbouring municipalities (see Beardsley et al. 2015 for recent evidence on displacement in a lot of conflicts). A perennial concern in policy discussions about counterinsurgency is an under-resourced programme might simply relocate, instead of reduce, rebels. In keeping with this, we find that PDT significantly increases malnutrition in neighbouring municipalities, an impact that’s entirely concentrated among neighbours who never receive PDT themselves. This evidence is in keeping with the interpretation that it’s the current presence of Maoist insurgents that’s deleterious to child health, and that shifting the rebels simply shifts the problem. Actually, the spillover effects are so large that the aggregate program effects are near zero, since improvements among recipient municipalities are mostly (though not entirely) offset by worsening malnutrition among non-recipients.
Expectations for the G20 meeting on 15 November could be excessive. You won’t acknowledge changes to the institutions of global governance, nor does it develop an ‘n-point plan’ for coping with the crisis. Its primary objective ought to be to bolster confidence by convincing the general public and market participants that the leaders understand the problems and also have a clear process for confronting them with an acceptable timetable. Commentators shouldn’t say afterwards, ‘Fine principles, but where will be the details?’ The leaders should convince us that is a mistaken demand, that their demonstration of unity on the principles and the procedure goes side-by-side with the short-run measures they already are taking. And if, for instance, wide-ranging fiscal stimulus is essential (as I believe it really is), governments are learning that already and do not need to act explicitly in concert.
Since the financial meltdown, curbing systemic risk has turned into a key objective for policymakers all over the world. This column sheds light on what successful capital requirements are with regard to reducing systemic risk, in the context of the European banking sector. Results show an upsurge in capital requirements in Europe result in heightened measures of systemic risk, towards the goals of the exercise. This will not imply, however, that capital requirements are welfare decreasing.
In Brownlees and Engle (2011), 1 a style of this form is implemented predicated on publicly available data as a way to determine which institutions are systemically risky, what the expense of a bailout will be, and how this leads naturally to a regulatory strategy. The results of the analysis are updated weekly and posted here. Email address details are posted both for about 100 US financial firms and for 1200 global financial firms. Information out of this website will be described below.