The geographical distance between two countries includes a substantial effect on their economic relationship, affecting trade, foreign direct investment, and international banking linkages. Using data from the fantastic Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic, this column demonstrates that the financial linkages between countries located definately not each other experience more volatility during crises than those between countries that are closer together. Policymakers worried about their country’s contact with global cycles should focus not merely on the primary trading partners, but also on trade flows with an increase of distant partners.
Distance education technologies are attracting attention as demand for advanced schooling grows all over the world, but credible evidence on the effects on students’ outcomes is scarce. This column studies the impact of online live streaming of lectures on student achievement and attendance in a test out first-year undergraduate students at the University of Geneva. It finds that students utilize the live streaming technology only once events make attending class very costly, and that attending lectures via live streaming lowers achievement for low-ability students but increases it for high-ability ones.
Our recent research can be an try to quantitatively analyse the current presence of barriers to joint research from the viewpoint of geographical distance and also additional barriers regarding joint research across firm borders (Inoue, Nakajima, and Saito 2013). Utilizing a database predicated on patent applications published in japan patent gazette, we construct a distinctive dataset on inter-establishment research collaborations. Then, predicated on the locational information of every establishment, we calculate all the bilateral geographical distances between collaborative pairs of establishments and examine the characteristics of collaborative relationships indicated by the form of the distribution of the distances.
We implement a comparatively new econometric methodology for separating out the factors driving national business cycles into global, group-specific, and country-specific factors. This methodology has the ability to capture spillovers of business cycle fluctuations across countries without making any strong assumptions about the size, direction, or time pattern of the spillovers. The global factor represents fluctuations that are normal to all or any countries and all three variables in each country. The group-specific factor captures fluctuations that are normal to a particular band of countries.
History shows that new technology can disrupt societies, and current developments in automation have raised anxious speculation on what might happen if stable middle-class jobs are bought out by machines. This column analyses the impact of technological change on labour markets and social protests, taking the case of the adoption of electricity in early 20th century Sweden. It finds that electrification did raise the incidence of local strikes, but that disputes were connected with workers demanding higher wages and better working conditions instead of wanting to block innovation.
During the past 30 years, defaults on corporate bonds in america have already been substantially above the historical average. Using firm-level data, this column implies that the upsurge in credit risk could be largely attributed to a rise in the rate of which new and fast-growing firms displace incumbents, a phenomenon thought as ‘disruption’. Incumbent revenue growth suffers when there are plenty of IPOs within an industry, and newly issued bonds in high-disruption industries have higher yields.
We find that cross-country variation in the dispersion of marginal revenue products is basically driven by differences in a country’s business, institutional, and policy environment instead of by differences in firm characteristics by itself. This result is important since it provides large-scale microeconomic evidence that institutions can explain the variation in marginal revenue products across EU firms.
Table 1 Machado-Mata decomposition of the marginal revenue products of capital and labour
For illustrative purposes of the framework’s analytical value, we examined data on SDG progress and populist vote shares which were designed for 39 countries (SDG progress data in 2010 2010 – 2015). Although, because of a period lag, the raw data sometimes precede that period; populist vote share data represent the differ from second-last to last election, with the last election mainly occurring between 2015 and 2018 (for details, see Kroll and Zipperer 2020). Most countries fall into Quadrant I and IV. Quite simply, some of the countries examined have observed progress towards the SDGs, they differ when it comes to if the electorate has subsequently considered populists or not. Numerous countries also have experienced SDG regress, and subsequently seen a rise in electoral support for populists (Quadrant I). Minimal countries are available in Quadrant III, with Greece as an exception where possibly a disillusionment with populists has meant that voters turned from them. Yet another analysis for every SDG separately are available in the paper.
Japan has already established relatively few victims of COVID-19, despite the fact that japan government has adopted more modest measures than other nations. Nonetheless, the pandemic is a substantial strain on citizens’ mental health, which might have triggered rises in domestic violence. This column presents evidence from various Japanese prefectures, concentrating on people’s mental wellbeing before and following the state of emergency was declared. Results indicate that the announcement led citizens to take preventive steps, but caused them to see certain heightened emotions. Crucially, the need for mental healthcare shouldn’t be overlooked as yet another policy consideration.
Those that can still remember the old-fashioned multiplier understand that it moves inversely with the marginal propensity to import. A good ‘Neanderthal’ or ‘hydraulic’ Keynesian would need to question the huge benefits to Germany of such an insurance plan. It is disingenuous to anticipate individual sovereign countries to activate in aggregate demand policy for the advantage of others, if domestic voters can’t be convinced of their own welfare gains.
Finally, modern macroeconomists have a far more nuanced view of fiscal demand management and the multiplier, and would reject the hydraulic Keynesian view of the world where prices are constant and consumers mechanically spend a constant fraction of their income. A far more modern perspective holds that only income-constrained households matter for the multiplier – it might be simply silly to argue that 100% as well as half of highly banked German households consume hand-to-mouth from disposable income. While remarkable consensus has emerged that fiscal policy at the zero lower bound works well, this pertains to closed economies and only so long as the nice faith and credit of borrowing countries remains intact. Incidentally, a lively discussion in Germany happens to be underway among mainstream economists, led by Carl Christian von Weizsäcker and Marcel Fratzscher, about benefiting from government low interest and buying infrastructure, which could have both short- and long-term gains. Hardly a posture of dogmatic anti-Keynesianism.